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EXPANDING TERRITORIAL BOUNDS: THE 
RECOGNITION DOCTRINE AFTER 
ZIVOTOFSKY V. KERRY 
Nicole Kirkilevich ∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,1 the Supreme Court for 
the first time “accepted a [p]resident’s direct defiance of an Act of 
Congress in the field of foreign affairs.”2 Zivotofsky examined the 
constitutional question of whether recognition power is shared 
between the political branches or whether it resides exclusively with 
one political branch. The Court answered this question by ruling that 
the president has the formal and exclusive power to decide what 
foreign nations the United States will recognize in nation-to-nation 
dealings.3 Curiously, although the Court allocated the power of 
recognition to the president, the statute at issue, section 214(d) of the 
Federal Relations Act,4 does not implicate recognition. As a result, 
the Court extended executive power beyond its already expansive 
authority. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the factual background and 
procedural history of Zivotofsky. Part III analyzes the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the president’s exclusive power to control 
recognition determinations and its effect on the validity of section 
214(d). Part IV presents the ramifications of the majority’s reasoning 
in Zivotofsky by expanding the president’s already robust foreign 
affairs power. Part V concludes that the Court had no authority to 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Business 
Administration, Loyola Marymount University May 2012. 
 1. (Zivotofsky VIII), 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 3. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Walking on a Tightrope on Mideast Policy, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 8, 2015, 1:32 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-
walking-on-a-tightrope-on-mideast-policy/. 
 4. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107−228, § 214(d), 
116 Stat. 1350 (2002). 
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answer this political question and that even if it did, the Court should 
not have considered recognition in its analysis. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2002, petitioner Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky was born in 
Jerusalem to United States citizens.5 In December 2002, Zivotofsky’s 
mother visited the American Embassy in Tel Aviv.6 There, she 
requested a passport with the place of birth listed as “Jerusalem, 
Israel.”7 Pursuant to State Department policy, the Embassy explained 
that the passport would list “Jerusalem” only.8 Zivotofsky’s parents, 
as his guardians, brought suit on his behalf in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to enforce 
section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act.9 
Section 214(d), titled Record of Place of Birth As Israel for 
Passport Purposes, reads: “For purposes of the registration of birth, 
certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United 
States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon 
the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the 
place of birth as Israel.”10 
In his suit, Zivotofsky challenged the secretary of state’s failure 
to implement section 214(d), which requires the Department of State 
to list an individual’s place of birth as “Jerusalem, Israel” rather than 
“Jerusalem.”11 The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the case, reasoning that Zivotofsky lacked standing because he 
suffered no injury-in-fact.12 Further, the court found that “the issue 
before the Court is a nonjusticiable political question and that the 
Court therefore lacks jurisdiction.”13 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed on 
the standing issue.14 It then addressed a different political question 
 
 5. Zivotofsky VIII, 135 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.; see Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky I), No. CIV.A.03-
1921, 2004 WL 5835212, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004). 
 10. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107−228, § 214(d), 
116 Stat. 1350, 1366. 
 11. Zivotofsky I, 2004 WL 5835212, at *2. 
 12. Id. at *3. 
 13. Id. at *4. 
 14. Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky II), 444 F.3d 614, 619 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (holding that that child suffered injury in fact as required for standing because “a concrete 
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regarding the meaning of section 214(d): whether section 214(d) 
entitles Zivotofsky to have just “Israel” listed as his place of birth on 
his passport and on his Consular Birth Report.15 
On remand, the district court applied the six factors set forth in 
Baker v. Carr,16 which dictate when an issue is a nonjusticiable 
political question.17 The court noted that the “presence of any one 
factor indicates that the case presents a non-justiciable political 
question.”18 These factors include: 
[1] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack 
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or 
[5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.19 
The court determined that the first, second, fourth, and sixth 
factors were present.20 It found that the first factor was present 
because “resolving [the plaintiff’s] claim on the merits would 
necessarily require the court to decide the political status of 
Jerusalem. The case law makes clear that the Constitution commits 
that decision to the executive branch.”21 The court held that the 
second factor was present because “the political situation in the 
Middle East is enormously complex, volatile, and long-standing. 
Indeed, ‘it is hard to conceive of an issue more quintessentially 
political in nature than the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which 
 
and particular injury for standing purposes can also consist of the violation of an individual right 
conferred on a person by statute”). 
 15. Id. at 619. 
 16. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 17. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky III), 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 
(D.D.C. 2007). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 103−106. The court did not analyze the third or fifth factors. See id. 
 21. Id. at 103. 
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has raged on the world stage with devastation on both sides for 
decades.’”22 
The fourth factor was present because the court determined that 
a decision on the merits “would risk offending either, or both, the 
legislative and executive branches, which are at loggerheads over 
United States policy regarding Jerusalem. Such conflicts are best 
resolved through political means, by the two political branches 
themselves.”23 Finally, the court found that the sixth factor was 
present, stating that if the court inserted its voice on the subject of 
Jerusalem’s status, “a controversial reaction is virtually 
guaranteed.”24 Additionally, “such a reaction can only further 
complicate and undermine United States efforts to help resolve the 
Middle East conflict.”25 
Ultimately, the district court affirmed its prior ruling that it 
lacked subject matter over the suit and granted the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that 
the case at hand presented a nonjusticiable political question.26 The 
plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia once again 
held that, since the judiciary had no authority “to order the Executive 
Branch to change the nation’s foreign policy in this matter,” this case 
was nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.27 
Subsequently, Zivotofsky filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The 
Supreme Court directed the parties to argue whether section 214 of 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, “impermissibly infringes 
the [p]resident’s power to recognize foreign sovereigns.”28 
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court determined that the 
question raised in Zivotofsky was not a political question because 
“‘[n]o policy underlying the political question doctrine suggests that 
 
 22. Id. at 104 (citing Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 111–12 (D.D.C. 2005)). 
 23. Id. at 105. 
 24. Id. at 106. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 107. 
 27. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky IV), 571 F.3d 1227, 1228 (D.D.C. 2004). The 
court stated: 
It has been the longstanding policy of the United States to take no side in the 
contentious debate over whether Jerusalem is part of Israel. In this case, the federal 
courts are asked to direct the Secretary of State to contravene that policy and record in 
official documents that Israel is the birthplace of a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem. 
Id. 
 28. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky V), 131 S. Ct. 2897, 2897 (2011). 
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Congress or the Executive . . . can decide the constitutionality of a 
statute; that is a decision for the courts.’”29 In making this 
determination, the Court remanded the issue to the lower court for 
resolution of the claims that the lower court’s error prohibited the 
parties from addressing.30 
The case was remanded to the district court to decide whether 
“exclusive Executive Branch Power authorizes the Secretary to 
decline to enforce section 214(d).”31 The court held the president 
holds the exclusive power to determine whether to recognize a 
foreign sovereign.32 Additionally, it found that by enacting section 
214(d), Congress intended to force the State Department to deviate 
from its position of neutrality on which, if any, nation or government 
is sovereign over Jerusalem.33 As a result, the court concluded 
section 214(d) intrudes on the president’s recognition power and is 
therefore unconstitutional. Again, Zivotofsky sought Supreme Court 
review.34 
In 2015, the Supreme Court issued its final ruling. The Court 
affirmed the lower court’s determination that the president has the 
exclusive power to recognize foreign nations and governments and 
that section 214(d) infringes on that power.35 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Court’s opinion in Zivotofsky, through an examination of 
the Constitution, case precedent, and history, decided the scope of 
recognition authority. The majority answered two questions: first, 
which political branch holds the power to grant formal recognition to 
a foreign sovereign, and second, whether section 214(d) of the 
Foreign Relations Act is constitutional. Yet throughout the 
majority’s analysis, the Court conceded that section 214(d) does not 
involve a question of recognition because the dispute at hand was not 
 
 29. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky VI), 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2012) 
(citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941–42 (1983)). 
 30. Id. at 1430. 
 31. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky VII), 725 F.3d 197, 205 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 134 S. Ct. 1873 (2014), 
and aff’d sub nom. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky VIII), 135 S. Ct. 2076 
(2015). 
 32. Id. at 214. 
 33. Id. at 220. 
 34. Zivotofsky VIII, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 35. Id. 
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about recognizing nation-states. Rather, the dispute was about the 
territory of a nation-state—whether Jerusalem is a part of Israel or 
whether it is its own stateless territory. 
A.  Exclusive Authority over Recognition Power 
In deciding which branch has the “exclusive” authority to grant 
formal recognition, the Court referred to Justice Jackson’s tripartite 
framework from his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer.36 The Court focused on Justice Jackson’s third 
category: “when the [p]resident takes measures incompatible with 
the expressed or implied will of Congress . . . he can rely only upon 
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter.”37 In order to satisfy this category, the 
president’s asserted power must be “exclusive” and “conclusive” on 
the issue.38 The Court found that in refusing to implement section 
214(d), the president may rely only on the powers the Constitution 
grants to him alone.39 
Throughout its analysis, the Court looked not only at the text 
and structure of the Constitution, but also to precedent and historical 
practice. The Court focused on the notion that the Nation must have 
a single policy regarding which governments are legitimate in the 
eyes of the United States and which are not.40 
1.  The Constitution 
In the text and structure of the Constitution, there is not one 
express clause that gives the president exclusive authority over 
foreign affairs.41 The Court examined a number of different 
executive powers granted by the Constitution to create a “logical and 
proper” inference that the president has the power to recognize 
nations. The Court focused on the president’s “recognition power,” 
defining it as a “‘formal acknowledgement’ that a particular ‘entity 
 
 36. 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Zivotofsky VIII, 135 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 37. Zivotofsky VIII, 135 S. Ct. at 2083–84. 
 38. Id. at 2084. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 2086 (“Foreign countries need to know before entering into diplomatic relations or 
commerce with the United States, whether their ambassadors will be received; their officials will 
be immune from suit in federal court; and whether they may initiate lawsuits here to vindicate 
their rights.”). 
 41. Id. at 2084 (“Despite the importance of the recognition power in foreign relations, the 
Constitution does not use the term “recognition,” either in Article II or elsewhere.”). 
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possesses the qualifications for statehood’ or ‘that a particular regime 
is the effective government of a state.’”42 
First, the Court found that the Constitution’s Reception Clause 
grants the president the power to recognize foreign nations and 
governments.43 Article II, Section 3 states that the president shall 
have the authority to “receive ambassadors and other public 
ministers.” The majority noted that “[a]t the time of the founding . . . 
prominent international scholars suggested that receiving an 
ambassador was tantamount to recognizing the sovereignty of the 
sending state.”44 Therefore, it concluded, as a “logical and proper” 
inference, that a clause that directs the president to receive and 
acknowledge ambassadors would be understood as giving the 
president the power to recognize nations.45 However, Justice 
Roberts, in his dissent, noted that the provision, “framed as an 
obligation rather than an authorization,” is alongside the duties 
imposed on the president by Article II, Section 3, not a power 
granted to him by Article II, Section 2.46 
Second, the Court inferred that the president was granted the 
power of recognition from other Article II powers, such as the power 
to make treaties and appoint ambassadors.47 The majority briefly 
mentioned the president’s treaty-making power,48 stating that 
“recognition may occur on ‘the conclusion of a bilateral treaty,’ or 
the ‘formal initiation of diplomatic relations,’ including the dispatch 
of an ambassador.”49 Further it found that the president had the sole 
power to negotiate treaties, and that the Senate may not conclude or 
 
 42. Zivotofsky VIII, 135 S. Ct. at 2084 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 cmt. a (1987)). 
 43. Id. at 2085. 
 44. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he People ratified the Constitution with 
Alexander Hamilton’s assurance that executive reception of ambassadors ‘is more a matter of 
dignity than of authority’ and ‘will be without consequence in the administration of the 
government.’” (quoting another source)). 
 47. Id. at 2085 (majority opinion) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have 
Power . . . to make Treaties . . . and he shall nominate, . . . , shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, . . . but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the president alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the 
Heads of Departments.”)). 
 48. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 49. Id. at 2086 (quoting I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (7th 
ed. 2008)). 
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ratify treaties without presidential action.50 Thus, the Constitution 
assigned the president the power to effect recognition on his own 
discretion.51 
The Court noted that the Constitution did not grant Congress the 
constitutional power to initiate diplomatic relations with a foreign 
nation. The Court concluded by stating that these specific 
constitutional provisions, including those giving the president the 
power to appoint ambassadors and make treaties, bestowed the 
power of recognition on the president alone.52 
2.  Case Precedent 
Next, the Court cited relevant cases to provide instruction on 
addressing recognition power between the courts and political 
branches.53 The cases, however, did not provide instruction on 
addressing the division of recognition power between the president 
and Congress, which was at dispute here.54 
First, the Court examined a case involving a dispute over the 
status of the Falkland Islands in the mid-1800s.55 The Court noted 
that when the executive branch of the government assumes a fact 
regarding the sovereignty of an island or country, it is conclusive on 
the judiciary.56 Then, the Court fast-forwarded to the 1930s and 
1940s to examine the issues surrounding President Roosevelt’s 
recognition of the Soviet Government of Russia. The Court cited 
both United States v. Belmont57 and United States v. Pink.58 Neither 
case, however, considered the initial act of recognition. Rather both 
cases considered the validity of executive agreements. Still, the 
Court found that the language in both Belmont and Pink “[was] 
strong support for the conclusion that it is for the president alone to 
determine which foreign government are legitimate.”59 
 
 50. Id. (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 2088. In his dissent, Justice Roberts, acknowledging the president’s power to make 
treaties and appoint ambassadors, contends that those powers are shared with Congress and 
therefore do not support an inference that the power of recognition is exclusive to the president. 
Id. at 2113–16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 2088 (majority opinion). 
 55. Id. (citations omitted). 
 56. Id. (citing Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 421 (1839)). 
 57. 301 U.S. 324 (1941). 
 58. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
 59. Zivotofsky VIII, 135 S. Ct. at 2089. 
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In this instance, the Court expanded the boundary of executive 
power over foreign relations beyond the scope of the precedent it 
cited. At first it “decline[d] to acknowledge that unbounded power.” 
Yet it concluded by stating that the cases it cited “do not cast doubt 
on the view that the Executive Branch determines whether the United 
States will recognize foreign states and governments and their 
territorial bounds.”60 
3.  Historical Background 
Subsequently, the Court looked back to the founding of our 
nation and established that since then, the president has had 
unilateral authority to recognize new states.61 It noted that while 
some presidents have chosen to cooperate with Congress, Congress 
itself never exercised the power of recognition.62 Justice Thomas, in 
his concurring opinion, indicated that although the Constitution does 
specify a number of foreign affairs powers and divides them between 
the political branches, some foreign affairs powers exercised by the 
federal government are not specifically allocated to either political 
branch. But the president has engaged in conduct, such as the 
communicating with foreign ministers, issuing passports, and 
preventing sudden attacks, with the support of Congress since the 
earliest days of the Republic.63 
In its analysis, the Court considered times in which recognition 
power became relevant. First, the Court turned to the recognition 
debate that arose when France was torn by revolution in 1793. Then, 
Secretary of State Jefferson and President Washington, without 
consulting Congress, authorized the American ambassador to 
continue relations with the new regime. 
Second, in 1818, when South American colonies rose against 
Spain, Speaker of the House Henry Clay announced he “intended 
moving the recognition of Buenos Ayres and possibly Chile.”64 The 
proposed bill was defeated, in part because Congress agreed that 
 
 60. Id. at 2091; see also id. at 2090 (“This Court’s cases do not hold that the recognition 
power is shared.”). 
 61. Id. at 2091 (“From the first Administration forward, the [p]resident has claimed 
unilateral authority to recognize foreign sovereigns. For the most part, Congress has acquiesced 
in the Executive’s exercise of the recognition power.”). 
 62. Id. (citations omitted). 
 63. Id. at 2097 (citations omitted). 
 64. Id. at 2092 (citations omitted). 
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recognition power rested solely with the president.65 It was not until 
the president decided to recognize the South American republics, that 
Congress passed a resolution to appropriate funds for missions to the 
independent nations on the American continent.66 
The Court referred to a number of other events that required a 
recognition determination. Events such as: President Jackson facing 
a recognition crisis in Texas in 1835 when Texas rebelled against 
Mexico and formed its own government; President Lincoln 
requesting support for his recognition of Liberia and Haiti; and, 
decades later, President McKinley compromising with Congress 
regarding the independence of Cuba without recognizing a new 
Cuban government.67 The Court explained, “[f]or the next 80 years, 
presidents consistently recognized new states and governments 
without any serious opposition from, or activity in, Congress.”68 
In 1970, President Carter recognized the People’s Republic of 
China as the government of China—derecognizing the Republic of 
China, located in Taiwan.69 Throughout the legislative process, “no 
one raised a serious question regarding the [p]resident’s exclusive 
authority to recognize the [Peoples’ Republic of China]—or to 
decline to grant formal recognition to Taiwan.”70 In fact, Congress 
acknowledged the president’s recognition determination as a 
“completed, lawful act.”71 
The Court found that historical evidence indicated Congress’ 
acknowledgement of the president’s exclusive power to recognize 
foreign states and governments. In most cases, “Congress has 
respected the Executive’s policies and positions as to formal 
recognition.”72 
B.  Section 214(d)’s Infringement on Executive Power 
In holding that the Constitution assigned the president the means 
to effect recognition on his own initiative, the Court then had to 
 
 65. Id. (citations omitted). 
 66. Id. (citations omitted). 
 67. Id. at 2092–93. 
 68. Id. at 2093 (citations omitted). 
 69. Id. (citations omitted). 
 70. Id. at 2094. 
 71. Id. (citations omitted). 
 72. Id. Justice Roberts, however, found that “[s]ome [p]residents have claimed an exclusive 
recognition powers, but others have expressed uncertainty about whether such preclusive 
authority exists.” Id. at 2114 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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determine whether section 214(d) infringed on the “[e]xecutive’s 
consistent decision to withhold recognition with respect to 
Jerusalem.”73 “As a matter of United States policy, neither Israel nor 
any other country is acknowledged as having sovereignty over 
Jerusalem.”74 Therefore, section 214(d) “‘directly contradicts’ the 
‘carefully calibrated and longstanding Executive branch policy of 
neutrality toward Jerusalem.’”75 
The Court held that the executive’s exclusive power extends no 
further than his formal recognition determination.76 With that said, 
Congress is precluded from enacting a law that directly contradicts 
that recognition determination. Therefore, “[a]lthough the statement 
required by [section] 214(d) would not itself constitute a formal act 
of recognition, it is a mandate that the Executive contradict his prior 
recognition determination in an official document issued by the 
Secretary of state.”77 
While the Court acknowledged Congress’s “substantial” 
authority over passports, “to allow Congress to control the 
[p]resident’s communication in the context of a formal recognition 
determination is to allow Congress to exercise that exclusive power 
itself.”78 Consequently, the Court held section 214(d) was 
unconstitutional.79 
Section 214(d) was not a statute that implicated recognition 
power.80 Justice Roberts referred to the State Department’s 
explanation that identification and not recognition was the principal 
reason that United States passports require the place of birth 
information.81 In fact, “Congress has not disputed the Executive’s 
assurances that [section] 214(d) does not alter the longstanding 
United States position on Jerusalem.”82 Therefore, neither Congress 
nor the president regards section 214(d) as a recognition 
 
 73. Id. at 2094 (citations omitted); see also id. at 2086 (“Congress, by contrast, has no 
constitutional power that would enable it to initiate diplomatic relations with a foreign nation.”). 
 74. Id. at 2094. 
 75. Id. (citing Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky VII), 725 F.3d 197, 
216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). 
 76. Id. at 2095. 
 77. Id. (citations omitted). 
 78. Id. at 2096 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 2116. 
 81. Id. at 2114. 
 82. Id. 
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determination, “so it is hard to see how the statute could contradict 
any such determination.”83 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Court’s approach in Zivotofsky was a confusing attempt to 
stretch the president’s authority in the realm of foreign relations. 
This case is one that “present[ed] a political question inappropriate 
for judicial resolution.”84 So, the Court inserted its voice on a 
question that should have been left for the legislative and executive 
branches to resolve, a question that had consistently gone 
unanswered, and could have remained unanswered, in order to 
determine the validity of a statute that requires no recognition 
authority anyway. 
A.  Defining a Political Question 
A political question is an issue to be resolved and decision to be 
made by the political branches of government and not by the courts. 
It “is axiomatic in a system of constitutional government built on the 
separation of powers.”85 Historically, who is sovereign is not a 
judicial, but a political question, “the determination of which by the 
legislative and executive departments of any government 
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, 
and subjects of that government.”86 Since 1890, “[t]his principle has 
always been upheld by [the Supreme C]ourt, and has been affirmed 
under a great variety of circumstances.”87 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
found that a “passport inscribed ‘Jerusalem, Israel,’ might signify to 
others that the United States recognized Israel’s sovereignty over 
Jerusalem. Yet ‘[p]olitical recognition is exclusively a function of the 
Executive.’ For this reason . . . the case presented a political 
question—that is, a claim of unlawfulness that was nonjusticiable.”88 
 
 83. Id. at 2115. 
 84. Id. at 2096 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 85. Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 597 (1976). 
 86. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890). 
 87. Id. (citations omitted). 
 88. Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky II), 444 F.3d 614, 619 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (citations omitted); see also Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(“The instant case involves topics that serve as the quintessential sources of political questions: 
national security and foreign relations. ‘Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national 
security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.’” (citations omitted)). 
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court remained steadfast in concluding 
that the claim at hand was not a political question.89 And so, it 
proceeded to analyze the constitutionality of section 214(d). 
B.  The Unnecessary Recognition Discussion 
In answering its second inquiry, the Court considered the 
question of Jerusalem’s sovereignty by determining if section 214(d) 
was constitutional through a recognition determination: a 
determination the Court itself agreed it did not have to make.90 
The Constitution gives the president the exclusive authority to 
recognize or not to recognize a foreign state or government, and to 
maintain or not to maintain diplomatic relations with a foreign 
government.91 Further, “[n]onrecognition of a foreign sovereign and 
nonrecognition of its decrees are . . . deemed to be as essential a part 
of the power confided by the Constitution to the Executive for the 
conduct of foreign affairs as recognition.”92 
1.  Defining Israel 
In Zivotofsky, the Court’s dispute was not about recognizing 
Israel as a nation-state. Israel had been recognized by the United 
States since its declaration of independence in 1948.93 Further, that 
the United States declined to acknowledge Israel’s sovereignty over 
Jerusalem has not changed its recognition of Israel as a sovereign 
state.94 Ultimately, whatever position the United States did take with 
respect to the question of Jerusalem would not affect the recognition 
of Israel.95 The recognition question should have ended there. 
 
 89. See supra Part III. 
 90. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky VIII), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015) 
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(“To know all this is to realize at once that § 214(d) has nothing to do with recognition. Section 
214(d) does not require the Secretary to make a formal declaration about Israel’s sovereignty over 
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 91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 204 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 92. The Maret, 145 F.2d 431, 442 (3d Cir. 1944). 
 93. Constitutional Law—Separation of Powers—D.C. Circuit Holds That Recognition of 
Foreign Governments Is an Exclusive Executive Power—Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 725 
F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L. REV. 2154, 2155 (2014). 
 94. Zivotofsky VIII, 135 S. Ct. at 2112 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In fact, even if the United 
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of Israel as a sovereign state. 
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2.  Stepping Beyond the Scope of the Recognition Doctrine 
This case goes beyond the customary forms of recognition, such 
as the recognition of countries and governments.96 Instead, this case 
relates to Israel’s geographic scope:97 
In international practice, recognizing countries is quite 
different from making determinations about their borders. 
When a country is recognized, it is typically without any 
statement about its territorial scope. Indeed, new countries 
routinely come into the world with border disputes. The 
question is whether Congress gets to determine, when 
acting within its enumerated powers, which set of 
substantive law applies to the territory.98 
This dispute is about the status of Jerusalem, “one of the most 
contentious issues in recorded history.”99 The United States has a 
firm and steady policy of neutrality about which nation, or nations, 
can claim Jerusalem.100 Here, the Court believed that an official 
United States document—a passport that identified Jerusalem as in 
Israel—would undermine that long-standing policy.101 
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, challenged the notion that 
“international custom infers acceptance of sovereignty from the 
birthplace designation on a passport or birth report, as it does from 
bilateral treaties or exchanges of ambassadors.”102 The majority 
found that doctrine of recognition would prevent the United States 
from later disputing Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. However, 
Justice Scalia urged the Court to find that merely making a notation 
in a passport does not burden the nation with any international 
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obligations.103 Instead, it left the nation free to change its position in 
the future.104 
Even so, section 214(d) did not require a recognition 
determination. The majority stressed the notion that the president had 
exclusive authority over recognition power because it feared that 
there is a small possibility “observers overseas might misperceive the 
significance of the birthplace destination at issue in this case.”105 In 
fact, for the first time and because of that fear, the Court allowed the 
president to “defy an Act of Congress in the field of foreign 
affairs.”106 
C.  Expanding the President’s Vast Foreign Affairs Power 
The Court stretched its analysis of the president’s power of 
recognition beyond the limits of Article II. The Constitution creates 
an unmistakable separation of powers in the Federal Government.107 
Certain terms are defined, whereas others, like foreign affairs 
powers, are vague. With regard to foreign nations, the president is 
the constitutional representative of the United States.108 The 
president “manages our concerns with foreign nations and must 
necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon 
what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of 
success.”109 That does not give him the “exclusive power” to 
recognize a foreign nation or expand the territory of a foreign 
nation.110 
In its analysis, the Court allocated the president more authority 
than just his own Constitutional powers minus any of those granted 
to Congress over a particular matter.111 At the outset of the majority 
opinion, the Court required that the president’s claim be “scrutinized 
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with caution.”112 Further, the Court required the president to rely 
solely on the powers the Constitution grants to him alone.113 
Nevertheless, the Court did not abide by its outline and did not limit 
its analysis to the constitutional text. Instead, the Court relied on a 
myriad of methodological considerations to infer that the power of 
recognition is “exclusive” to the president.114 
For example, the Court referred to case precedent that touches 
on a different form of recognition than the case at hand.115 Further, 
the Court referred to a handful of events throughout history where 
the president, in conjunction with Congress, recognized nations 
rather than expanding territorial boundaries, as required here.116 As a 
result, Zivotofsky expanded the president’s already wide-ranging 
foreign affairs power—a power not expressly granted to the 
president in the Constitution. 
Judicial precedent is not the only area of the law affected by the 
decision in Zivotofsky. Until this case, the “Executive branch never 
possessed a judicial precedent that embraced its many functional 
arguments for presidential primacy in a decision that holds that the 
president can disregard a foreign affairs statute.”117 Now it does. 
Zivotofsky gives executive branch lawyers “more powerful 
ammunition” than it had in deciding whether to ignore foreign 
relations statutes in contexts that do not reach the courts for 
review.118 
Ultimately, while this question may not arise again for decades, 
“the world of implied executive powers in foreign affairs and 
perhaps elsewhere is very much with us, in both their concurrent and 
exclusive varieties.”119 Now, the president may decide to fight 
Congress on matters such as his authority to negotiate trade 
agreements without exercising his constitutional veto; or, he may 
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announce that he has recognized a government, with no apprehension 
about an effort of Congress to override him.120 On the other hand, 
“Congress might decide to up the ante by following Justice Kennedy 
and using the power of the purse, especially as part of a bill that the 
president must sign to keep the government from shutting down.”121 
In the long run, this decision may “erode the structure of separated 
powers that the People established for the protection of their 
liberty.”122 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court, in its decision, expanded both its authority over 
political questions and the president’s authority over foreign affairs. 
The question at hand should have been left to the legislative and 
executive branches to decide. The Court should not have inserted 
itself into a recognition analysis in a situation that does not require 
recognition. The Court’s attempt to determine the constitutionality of 
section 214(d) ultimately granted the president abundant power over 
foreign affairs that may have lasting effects on the nation’s structure 
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